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SUMMARY

As a detailed review of all the Party, ideological and economic attainments and shortcomings aired at the preceding Republican Party Congresses, Malenkov's report contains one notable omission. His treatment of the ideological aspect of Soviet life is far less extensive than some of the regional material on the topic might have led one to expect. Thus the resistance to women's equality with men, for example, an object of frequent criticism in the Central Asiatic Republics, gets no mention at all. Nor is this theme discussed by Beria, who spoke at some length, though in familiar terms, on the Soviet nationalities policy. There is no reference in Malenkov's speech to the "flight into the past" (ukhod v proshloye), the oft-criticized tendency among the Asiatic and other non-Russian historians and writers to idealize certain moments and movements in their own history other than those prescribed by the Party.

The only novel feature of the report is the official recognition of the infiltration (proniknovenie) from abroad of ideas, views and opinions inimical to Soviet ideological interests. This problem, it may be inferred, is further aggravated by the fact that: a) these anti-Marxian ideas apparently find some fertile soil among the "unstable elements" (neustoiichivie elementy) of the population, and b) there is no guarantee against the continued inflow of such alien (chuzhdie) views.

Malenkov's discussion of Party weaknesses is significant in that the attempts of certain officials to conceal unpleasant truths from the Party are treated inferentially as manifestations of a defense mechanism designed to ease the relentless pressure from above. The "tight cliques" of Communist officials bound to protect each other in any event, it is true, are organized for the purpose of covering a variety of nefarious activities. But the unfavorable reception usually accorded to criticism, particularly "from below" (snizu), appears to be prompted by the fear of consequences that the discovery of normal errors may precipitate.

In industry, lagging mechanization is still alluded to as one of the main roadblocks to greater production. Listed among the other failings are inflated requisitions for raw materials and other supplies, the concealment of actual plant capacity (obviously intended to forestall demands for greater output) and plain dishonesty on the part of the management. Agricultural workers are henceforth to be remunerated strictly according to their actual output -- a measure designed to stimulate incentive on the farms and to do away with the still prevailing "remnants" of the so-called wage levelling system. This step may have been taken also in view of the admitted shortage of such food staples as meat and dairy products and vegetables.

Malenkov's seemingly unaccountable reference to the almost forgotten faulty agricultural policy of high Communist officials is revealing in that the erstwhile overall agricultural boss and Politbureau member A.A. Andreyev is no longer listed among the membership of any of the new ruling Party bodies except the Central Committee.

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